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Abstract 
In this paper, we outline an analysis of DoD (US Department of Defense) 
contracting of private military firms (PMFs) in an expeditionary context.  The paper 
makes two contributions to research on this topic.  First, we outline a general model 
of how DoD acquisition skills and organization integration capabilities affect the 
contribution of PMFs to mission performance.  Second, we address risk 
management in PMF contracting by outlining a spectrum of control mechanisms.  As 
PMF management is clearly not the sole job of the acquisition community, we argue 
that DoD policy-makers should rethink how the department might change itself in 
order to integrate PMF services more effectively and efficiently. 
Keywords: acquisition, contracting, private military firms, private security 
companies, resource-based view, US Department of Defense. 
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Introduction 
Spending on contracted services by the US Department of Defense (DoD) 
has exceeded that on goods and supplies since the end of the Cold War (Camm, 
Blickstein & Ventnor, 2004).  As the DoD’s services acquisition volume continues to 
increase in scope and dollars, the Department must ensure effective acquisition 
planning, adequate requirements definition, sufficient price evaluation, and proper 
contractor oversight (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2005).  However, the DoD’s performance 
in managing this increasing volume and dollar value of service contracts has 
received significant criticism.  Most notably, the DoD’s reduced and aging acquisition 
workforce, trained mostly in obtaining goods and supplies, is straining under the 
unique requirements associated with service contracting.  Service activities cannot 
be inventoried, require customer contact and joint production, and have customer-
specific inputs.   
Moreover, program managers observe intangibility in varying degrees; such a 
subjective measurement makes evaluating the quality and performance of a service 
operation difficult (Apte, Ferrer, Lewis & Rendon, 2006).  Additionally, contracting for 
services rather than goods requires significantly more involvement from the end-
customer in terms of market research, requirements definition, contractor selection, 
monitoring, and evaluation (Melese, Franck, Angelis & Dillard, 2007).  The cutbacks 
of the 1990s hit the contracting workforce particularly hard; in addition, the steady 
growth in outsourcing of services has put additional strain on both the contracting 
workforce as well as the end-customer staff, who often serve as subject-matter 
experts or technical authorities throughout the contracting process.    
In the above context, the increasing volume of PMF (private military firm)1 
contracting poses particular challenges for the DoD.  The requirement for contracts 
                                            
1 We use the definition by Singer (2003) of PMFs, to include PSCs (private security firms) engaged in 
protection, training and advisory activities, as well as firms providing support services in deployed 
environments—such as logistics, base operations and information technology services (KBR being an 
example of a support services firm). 
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with these firms often results in chaotic deployment situations—with combat 
effectiveness and mission accomplishment taking priority over effective procurement 
practices or compliance with legal or regulatory requirements.  The variety of 
services provided by PMFs can include: 
 Static security—security for housing areas and work sites, including 
US military installations;  
 Personal security details—security for high-ranking US officials and 
[Department of State] Chief of Mission personnel;  
 Security escorts—security for US government employees, contractor 
employees, or others as they move through Iraq;  
 Convoy security—security for vehicles and their occupants as they 
make their way into Iraq or within Iraq; and  
 Security advice and planning. (GAO, 2008, July 31, p.7) 
It is often especially difficult for DoD personnel, whether they are members of 
the acquisition workforce or subject-matter experts, to monitor and evaluate PMF 
performance in the field.  Indeed, it has been suggested that this inability to evaluate 
leads to problematic situations—for instance, to a lack of market contestability, such 
that the contractor can take advantage of the government’s inability to monitor or 
replace the contractor (Melese et al., 2007).  Clearly, if the current practice of 
employing PMFs in a wide variety of roles continues in the future, then these present 
difficulties will only become more relevant and important (Carafano, 2008; Fainaru, 
2008).  The challenges remain salient as the US continues to deploy contractors 
alongside its troops: 
[Senate Armed Services] Committee members also asked [Secretary of 
Defense Robert] Gates how the department will handle contractors as the 
military presence shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan. He conceded that the use of 
contractors "grew willy-nilly" in Iraq after 2003 and was not accompanied by 
the necessary oversight capacity. He assured lawmakers that leaders are 
applying contracting lessons from Iraq to the developing approach to 
Afghanistan. The department nonetheless must do some soul-searching on 
the role of contractors in combat environments, Gates said. (Newell, 2009, 
January 27). 
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In this paper, we endeavor to grapple with the issues posed by PMF 
contracting from a general management perspective.2  We develop a framework that 
may aid defense professionals in thinking about the larger organizational issues 
involved in contracting for PMF services.  Based on this framework, we then provide 
several recommendations for DoD service contracting policy and practices that 
might enable the DoD to more effectively deal with PMFs and to obtain better value 
and better compliance with public policy.  
We make two broad claims, which can be summarized as follows: 
 First, PMF contracting has for too long been framed as an issue that 
only the acquisition community needs to address more effectively.  An 
alternative perspective is to see PMF contracting as a whole-
organization issue.  As suggested by the report of the Commission on 
Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations (2007),3 the reality is that contractors make up more than 
50% of deployed personnel in Iraq (about 11,000 of whom are 
employed by firms under contract with the US government (GAO, 
2008, July 31)). Indeed, it seems likely that this ratio will be a feature of 
US military expeditions for the foreseeable future.  It is essential that 
the DoD begins to change its mental models, doctrine and policy, 
structures and processes, to integrate PMFs more effectively.  
Specifically, policy-makers must recognize that how the DoD manages 
its contracts affects the value it can generate from having PMFs on its 
team.  Therefore, instead of asking how the contracting process can be 
used to make “them” (PMFs) more effective given what “we” do, the 
DoD needs to ask how it might change its policies and activities in 
ways that enable PMFs to make a more valuable contribution to the 
overall mission.  
 Second, as highlighted by the Gansler Commission, there is a 
selective and specific list of issues that the acquisition community 
needs to address in order to enable more effective PMF contracting.  
Our contribution is to highlight how these changes need to be seen in 
the context of the above remarks regarding the broader organizational 
integration of PMFs.  Most importantly, this means that the contracting 
                                            
2 By general management, we mean that we will draw on a range of concepts from organizational 
theory and strategic management.   
3 This document is often referred to as the “Gansler Commission” report after the chairman of the 
Commission, Dr. Jacques S. Gansler. We will adopt the same practice in this paper. 
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community is disabled from working more effectively whenever PMF 
contracting problems are simply tossed over the fence to them.  The 
contracting community will be more effective when its work is done in 
the context of broader organizational integration of PMFs. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  We begin by reviewing some recent findings 
on PMF contracting (with an emphasis on the Army’s Gansler Commission) and by 
laying out a general concept for the use of PMFs in DoD contingency operations.  
We then continue by reviewing the implications of this approach for the acquisition 
community and, in particular, address risk management in PMF contracting.  Finally, 
we conclude with a synopsis of the major points we make in the study.    
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The Gansler Commission as Context 
While there have been many public reports on the widespread use of PMFs 
and their conduct over the past few years, the Gansler Commission report is unique 
in providing an impactful assessment of the implications of this phenomenon for DoD 
acquisition communities. There have been hundreds of studies of different aspects 
of DoD acquisition challenges over the past twenty years—not including the regular 
reporting carried out by Congressional committees, the Government Accountability 
Office, Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, the DoD, 
defense component and Department of State (DoS) Inspectors General, and the 
Special Inspectors General for Iraq Reconstruction and for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction. Additionally, major studies include those of the Assessment Panel of 
the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project (2006), the Defense 
Acquisition Structures and Capabilities Review (2007), and the Commercial 
Activities Panel (2002). 
The Gansler report is comprehensive in its coverage of the issues involved 
and relates several somber messages about the mundane realities of contracting for 
services in an expeditionary environment.  It is reasonable to state that the threat to 
the combat performance of the US military, the significant waste of public funds, and 
the many needless deaths that have resulted from the increase in the use of PMFs 
in Iraq are the result of some unforeseeable and unmanageable issues within the 
DoD; however, they are also the direct responsibility of DoD leaders at many levels 
who felt that acting responsibly or insisting on the rule of law would threaten their 
careers. 
The use of PMFs has a long history, which usually is thought to begin with the 
end of the Cold War and which has been exhaustively documented by the reports 
described above that preceded the Gansler Commission.  The expansion of the 
defense sector into large-scale contracting of services, which began with the 
downsizing of the military and DoD civil service in the 1990s under the Army’s 
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), was at best a partial success.  In 
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the Balkan conflicts of this period, the DoD systematically demonstrated major 
weaknesses in LOGCAP contracting for even basic support such as facilities, 
laundry, construction, and food services.  Contract oversight was lacking; the quality 
of services provided varied enormously, and there was little interest in improving the 
quality of the acquisition workforce that was being downsized along with the rest of 
the DoD.  There was, and perhaps continues to be, a discomfort with the paradox 
that outsourcing actually increases the need for in-house personnel and training 
(GAO, 1997).   
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to a major need for contracting of both the 
mundane support services typical of the Balkan conflicts and of PMFs to, in fact, 
replace military personnel. After such a change, the quality of contracting or of the 
resulting services could hardly be expected to improve.  The GAO commented with 
respect to what have should been, by that point, an effective and efficient LOGCAP 
program for basic contract services: 
However, at the DoD level, no one is responsible for overall leadership in 
using the contract and, while AMC [Army Materiel Command, the sponsor of 
LOGCAP] has sought to influence the way in which the other components 
carry out their roles, it does not have command authority over the other 
components and thus its influence is limited. For example, AMC knew that 
planning for the use of LOGCAP for Operation Iraqi Freedom was not 
comprehensive but lacked the command authority to direct better planning. 
AMC officials believe that training will resolve these problems over time. 
However, given the importance of LOGCAP to supporting military operations 
and the billions of dollars being spent on LOGCAP activities, we believe that 
more immediate and direct oversight is needed. (GAO, 2005, Highlights page) 
If basic services continued to be a challenge, the expansion to what 
eventually became a total force (made up of approximately one contractor for every 
member of the military coalition) could not be expected to work well.  Not only is it a 
truism that services are far more complex and time-consuming to manage than 
goods, but it is also the case that the closer those “services” approach the 
application of force or weaponry against people or territory (what the military 
sometimes call “kinetic operations”), the closer the DoD gets to a virtual explosion of 
contracting workload, contractor liaison and evaluation, legal requirements, media 
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attention, diplomatic issues, and human rights matters that all quickly garner 
international scrutiny. 
As we have stated, a military that had barely digested the contracting-out of 
food services in Bosnia now had “contractors” providing “services” in Iraq; such 
services included the right to self-defense using firearms—from pistols up to .50 
caliber machine guns—that could be directed at any person considered a threat 
without any risk of accountability.  One cannot just blame the downsized acquisition 
community for this situation, but military commanders and their political supervisors 
for acquiescing to a loss of the chain of the command that the US Constitution was 
designed to prevent.  What needed to be done in hours—such as creating, 
modifying or immediately terminating a contract—was work that DoD culture viewed 
as a go-slow, legally and bureaucratically complex process governed by hundreds of 
regulations that were difficult to implement even under ideal conditions within a 
relatively comfortable office environment in the US   
The Gansler Commission was quite clear that what had been created was a 
new, integrated, military/contractor force that the DoD and, to a certain extent, the 
Department of State (DoS) were certainly accountable for but were not leading or 
even attempting to manage.  Even at the time of this writing, while there is a 
statutory basis for holding accountable PMFs hired by the DoD, those hired by other 
US government agencies (including the DoS) are subject only to host country and 
international law. The sketchy nature of this legal framework has been effectively 
described by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO): 
Various laws exist to hold PSC employees accountable for criminal acts 
committed in a wartime environment beyond the borders of the United States. 
These laws include US criminal laws that may be applied extraterritorially, the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ), international law, as well as Iraqi laws. Whether a particular 
law provides extra-territorial jurisdiction over a criminal act by a PSC 
employee depends on the specific facts of the incident, such as the time, 
nature and location of the alleged crime, the nature of the contractor’s 
employment, and the nationality of the accused. For example, an employee of 
a DOD contractor, whether a US citizen or Third Country National, who 
commits a felony while accompanying the Armed Forces in Iraq during a 
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contingency operation may be charged under the UCMJ or MEJA. With 
regard to other than DOD contractor employees, a panel of State Department 
representatives reporting on protective services in Iraq concluded in October 
2007 that the legal framework for holding non-Department of Defense 
contractor employees accountable under US law is inadequate. Congress is 
presently considering legislation that would clarify and extend US criminal 
jurisdiction over individuals employed under a contract awarded by any US 
department or agency where contract performance is located in the area of a 
contingency operation. In addition to US law, the legal framework for holding 
PSCs accountable includes applicable international law and Iraqi law. Also, 
contract provisions serve to regulate contractor behavior. (GAO, 2008, July 
31, p. 3) 
Further highlighting the importance of an appropriate legal framework, the 
Gansler Commission emphasized how contracting provides the critical link in 
monitoring performance, and how good contract management practices are 
essential to mission performance: 
Contracting is the nexus between our warfighters’ requirements and the 
contractors that fulfill those requirements—whether for food service, 
interpreters, communications operations, equipment repair, new or modified 
equipment, or other supplies and services indispensable to warfighting 
operations. In support of critical military operations, contractor personnel must 
provide timely services and equipment to the warfighter; and the Army 
contracting community must acquire those services and equipment 
effectively, efficiently, and legally; while operating in a dangerous, fast-paced 
environment. Over half of the personnel currently in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
contract employees. This puts Army contracting (writing, negotiating, 
monitoring, and achieving accountability and enforcement of the contracts), 
along with modern (information-based) logistics support, squarely at the 
forefront of our challenges in supporting expeditionary operations. It also 
invokes command-level issues: Commanders must have timely situational 
awareness of contracts and contractor personnel and assets on the 
battlefield, to properly plan, synchronize operations, and manage the supply 
chain. 
The Army currently lacks the leadership and personnel (military and civilian) 
to provide sufficient contracting support to either expeditionary or peacetime 
operations. The Army’s difficulty in adjusting to the singular problems of 
Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan is in large part due to the fact that there are no 
Generals assigned to contracting responsibilities. This is a decade-old blight: 
the cutbacks began in 1991, and no General Officers have held an Army 
contracting position since 1998.  In a military environment (especially in an 
expeditionary environment), the number and level of the Generals associated 
with a discipline reflects its importance. A General is held accountable for his 
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or her leadership. Today, the Secretary of the Army cannot replace a General 
and obtain a new start for Army contracting—the Army has no Generals doing 
contracting. (Commission on Army Acquisition on and Program Management 
in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, pp. 3-4) 
The above language is unusually direct for any report commissioned by the 
DoD.  Yet, the findings and recommendations of Gansler and his fellow 
commissioners have been largely implemented—and within barely a year—by the 
Army at least, as we discuss further below.  However, the DoD still needs to develop 
true expertise at managing PMFs given their potential for lethal use of force.  As 
others have argued, if the DoD does not manage PMFs in a consistently exemplary 
and totally legal manner, then the Executive Branch will be undermining democracy 
by condoning illegal violence as a bureaucratic inconvenience (Singer, 2007).   
In its report quoted above, the GAO further emphasized the inadequate legal 
framework for regulating PMFs. Such a deficiency, when combined with the major 
management inadequacies highlighted by the Gansler Commission, creates an 
impossible challenge.  The last sentence of the GAO quotation above is particularly 
insightful: due to lack of laws, it is expected that as a final resort, contract provisions 
can be used to “regulate contractor behavior.”  With the initiation of a gradual 
withdrawal of Multinational Force troops from Iraq, the US has signed a Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Iraqi government to cover the jurisdiction over 
US government and contractor personnel.  The status of PMFs under the new SOFA 
“remains unresolved” (US Department of State, 2008). 
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Toward a Framework for PMF Contracting 
The Gansler report is helpful in identifying the core issues in PMF contracting 
that need to be incorporated into a coherent framework.  In Figure 1 below, we 
propose a conceptual framework that guides our discussion in the rest of this 
section.4 
Figure 1. How PMF Resources Fit into the Mission 
 
In this figure, we seek to relate—at a broad conceptual level—the role of PMF 
resources in mission accomplishment.  Following the insights of the Gansler 
Commission, we propose that PMFs facilitate mission success by enabling a more 
flexible response to the military tasks that need to be accomplished.  When there is 
                                            
4 We build this figure in part based on the recent article by Nadkarni and Narayanan (2007) on clock 
speed in strategic thinking, and in part from more traditional organizational and strategic management 
work on contingency theory by Lawrence and Lorsch (1986). 
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a premium on flexibility, PMFs may play a useful role in getting military results.  
Figure 1 is comprised as follows:  
 Performance in the diagram is a pseudonym for whatever military 
goals DoD leadership defines as important. 
 Flexibility is defined as the ability to continually change organizational 
actions, asset deployments and investments (Nadkarni & Narayanan, 
2007). Flexible organizations exhibit diversity and rapid shifts in their 
actions and responses.  Flexibility has three dimensions.  
o First, speed of response, 
o Second, variability in the size of response, and,  
o Third, variety in the type of response.  
 PMF resources refer to the portfolio of service contractors the DoD 
employs to support its expeditionary missions. 
 Op tempo/clock speed is a relative measure of the pace of change in 
a deployed situation.  It reflects both the pace of change in: 
o Exogenous variables, such as the security situation in Iraq, 
which might be improving quickly or slowly relative to other war 
zones; and, in 
o Endogenous variables, such as organizational change (turnover 
of combatant commanders, etc.). 
Either type of change affects op tempo.  We would expect that this variable 
moderates the relationship between flexibility and performance, with flexibility being 
more valuable when clock speed is higher. 
 Task variability is a relative measure of the changeability of task 
requirements.  Much recent military literature has been concerned with 
describing the changing nature of the recent military task at hand—
perhaps none so powerfully as by van Creveld (1991) in his book, The 
Transformation of War.  Again, we expect that task variability 
moderates the relationship between flexibility and performance, with 
flexibility being more valuable when variability is higher. 
 Acquisition skill is defined as the DoD’s capability in contracting for 
PMFs. At a practical level, it concerns issues such as the 
prequalification of contractors, the organizational knowledge of the 
portfolio, and the availability of boutique contractor offerings.  We 
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expect that acquisition skill moderates the effectiveness with which 
PMF services may contribute to flexibility and, therefore, to 
performance—with a more skilled acquisition ability leading to higher 
flexibility.  For example, prequalification and knowledge may both 
contribute to a more flexible military response by enabling a wider 
variety of resources to be offered faster.   
 Organization integration capability is defined here as ability of the 
DoD to seamlessly combine and amalgamate PMF resources to form a 
total expeditionary force.  An example of such capability would be the 
development of organizational structures and processes (i.e., 
command-and-control systems) that allocate, coordinate, and 
assimilate contractor manpower effectively.5  We expect that 
organization integration capability also moderates the relationship 
between PMF resources and flexibility (thus, ultimately, task 
performance—whatever that may be), with better integration capability 
yielding a more flexible expeditionary system. 
The framework thus described is conventional in the sense that it builds on 
well-established strategic management and organizational theory (Mintzberg, 2008; 
Jones, 2006).  Its usefulness, therefore, does not lie in its surprising features or in its 
radicalness—for we make no claims that the set of relationships outlined here is 
earth-shattering.  Rather, its usefulness lies in establishing a set of relationships in 
an explicit way and, thus posed, in a way that encourages testing by both 
commonsense experience and by quantitative research.   
Next, we turn to considering further the organizational integration of DoD 
elements and PMF services together as a single system of resources.   
                                            
5 According to a GAO (2008, October 1) report, DoD, State and USAID [US Agency for International 
Development] systems used merely for tracking the presence of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have been inadequate.  The report states that: 
Complete and reliable data were not available for GAO to determine the total number of 
contractor personnel who worked on DOD, State, and USAID contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
[…].   DOD did not routinely evaluate the data for accuracy […].  Neither State nor USAID had 
systems in place during our review period to track the number of contractor personnel. As a 
result, they could not provide complete personnel data […]. According to DOD and State officials, 
information on killed and wounded contractor personnel was not systematically tracked, which left 
them unable to provide reliable or complete data. (Highlights page) 
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The Challenge of DoD Organizational Integration of 
PMFs 
One important contribution made by the strategic management field to the 
understanding of how organizations function is its focus on the underlying resources 
that enable performance.  This is referred to as the RBV (resource-based view) of 
the firm (Barney, 1991).  In this section of the paper, we pick up several threads of 
RBV reasoning and use them to clarify the nature of some of the DoD’s challenges 
in contracting PMFs. 
Perhaps the key conceptual move that the RBV makes is to examine 
organizations with a different unit of analysis than other approaches.  Instead of 
seeing contracting organizations (e.g., DoD) and contractors (e.g., DynCorp), we are 
encouraged to move away from these distinctions and focus instead on the 
underlying resources that are at work.  Each organization is considered to be a 
bundle of resources amalgamated together and interacting with each other in a 
variety of ways.   
Some resources might be individuals endowed with human capital, such as 
acquisition officers with certain skills, training and abilities.  Other resources might 
be organization-level, some of them visible patterns of interaction, routines and rules 
that the organization uses to enable it to go about its business.  Some organization-
level resources might be less tangible, such as the culture and norms about “the way 
things get done around here” that, nonetheless, contribute to the functioning of the 
organization.  Some resources are to be found in networks of organizations, joint 
ventures and alliance arrangements (Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996).  Note also 
that from the RBV, most of the value associated with resources derives from the 
information and knowledge embedded within them.  For example, in a study of 
biotechnology networks by Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996), the network of 
relationships between biotechnology organizations was the resource that generated 
critical new learning, knowledge and cutting-edge research and development.   
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Looking at tha situation this way, one might argue that the key challenge for 
any organization is how to assemble a total bundle of resources that enables certain 
jobs to get done.  After all, the impact of resources ultimately occurs at a group 
level—it is the collection of resources acting together that has an impact.  At this 
level of abstraction, the question of which resources belong to which organization is 
subordinated to the prior task of assembling a bundle, system or ecology of 
resources together that will have a capability for performing specified tasks 
adequately.   
Accordingly, based on Figure 1, we would predict that (all other things being 
equal) the general availability of PMF resources would improve DoD mission 
performance by adding flexibility to DoD capability.  This flexibility might be derived 
from the speed in which resources can be made available, from accessing capacity, 
and from the wide selection of resources available.  Therefore, in principle, PMF 
resources add to DoD capability, all other things being equal. Two observations are 
important here: 
 First, the task of assembling resources is a dynamic one.  As the 
technologies used in warfare become more complex, there is an 
ongoing process of specialization and, therefore, a re-division of labor 
resources and development of new organizational resources (van 
Creveld, 1991; van Creveld, 2006).  Thus, an important characteristic 
of the resource pool is that it is an ever-expanding and increasingly 
complex ecology of niches.  This is true for technology when it is 
considered as electronics but is also true for technology when it 
manifests itself as new practices, such as new ways of organizing.  
These are all constantly specializing and expanding—which arguably 
makes the task of contracting more difficult over time since the value of 
specialist knowledge is often hard to understand from the outside, i.e., 
without having specialist knowledge.   
 Second, it is extremely important to focus not just on the tangible 
resources that can be observed, but also on the intangibles.  This is 
the lesson of the biotech networks referred to above: the maze of 
interstices, gaps and relationships between players are less visible, 
but—as an element of collective activity, the system, the ecology—they 
are just as important as the more easily observed elements.  Whereas 
the DoD’s resource ecology for goods (such weapon systems, parts, or 
supplies) has a long history, is rich and well developed, its resource 
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ecology for services is (arguably) somewhat less understood and 
developed.  Yet, the lesson of other systems is that the task of 
integrating all the resources together is an important activity in itself, 
and arguably one that is much too important to be shoved aside as a 
“mere” contracting issue.  Instead, we have to pay careful attention to 
how contractor and DoD resources work together in this complicated 
linked ecology of resources.6 
Though for any specific task there are usually many good arguments for why 
the task should be performed by either a contractor or a government employee, a 
less well-developed issue concerns the synergy between making and buying 
services.  Yet, the resource-based perspective we use here highlights this largely 
unnoticed issue.  When we view an organization more broadly as an ecology (or 
integrated system) of interacting resources, we can see that making and buying are 
not discrete choices.  Instead, there is a third logic: that the distinct choice to make 
and buy has its own reasoning (Parmigiani, 2007).   
An obvious example of this is the way both making and buying a resource 
creates the option of substituting or switching out resources for one another, which 
adds flexibility to organizational arrangements, in the spirit of Figure 1.  This 
flexibility can be especially valuable when employed resources are more 
flexible/general purpose than contracted resources.  In this case, backfilling an 
employed resource can increase DoD capability for performing its mission. 
In her comprehensive study of making and buying, Parmigiani found 
statistical support for some value of flexibility from simultaneously making and 
contracting.  This insight points to the possible value of having a network of pre-
qualified PMFs on hand (the value residing in the network, of course) that can 
provide direct support by performing specific tasks, and/or indirect support by 
backfilling DoD employees that can be released for other tasks.  An example of this 
logic might apply to convoy-protection duties in Iraq, which have sometimes been 
                                            
6 Of course, as in any ecology, there are arguments and contests about jurisdictions, i.e., who is 
qualified to do what work—PMFs or the DoD?  These issues constantly flare up in the PMF sector, 
usually for good reasons, some of which we explore later in this paper. 
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staffed by military personnel and sometimes by contractors; the latter option then 
releases member of the military for higher-value duties. 
Parmigiani determined that a second reason why organizations generally 
engage in both making and buying was better economics.  This may be the result of 
leveraging efficiencies of scale for both in-house and contracted resources.  In the 
case of PMFs, the argument would be that the DoD operates at a large scale that is 
very inefficient for some aspects of a deployment; in contrast, PMFs may operate at 
a smaller scale that is more “right-sized” for certain mission requirements.  
Therefore, making and buying might leverage synergy between large and small 
resources.  One example that highlights this point is the early days of US operations 
in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, which involved small-scale PMF support.   
A third reason for making and buying that was supported in Parmigiani’s 
study and is relevant to the DoD is mutual learning opportunities.  There are 
doubtless some specialties in which both the DoD and PMFs have expertise—for 
example, activities such as de-mining.  In these activities, organizations can take 
advantage of their own expertise by performing activities themselves, but also may 
learn from contractors’ expertise by buying-in their services.  Thus, in some 
situations, there may be bilateral benefits from both making and buying, and in the 
best-case scenario, there is a beneficial learning spiral from this interaction. 
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Co-specialization of Resources 
Beyond the make-and-buy issue, a further aspect of the organizational 
integration of PMFs that a resource-based perspective highlights is the co-
specialization of resources (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003).  A recurring point is that 
PMFs generate incentives for military personnel and civil servants with highly 
specialized skills to retire from government service, and proffer their abilities under 
private contracts priced much higher than their former DoD pay.  Less noticed, this 
issue points to important issues regarding the co-specialization of resources.  First, 
resources—say skills in underwater demolition—have value from being included in a 
coalition of resources that are in use and demanded.  On their own, any individual 
resource will have some value; but this value is increased enormously when 
operating as part of a system of complementary resources. (In the case of our 
underwater demolition expert, this might be other specialists with complementary 
skills that operate as a team, but it would also have to include the necessary 
hardware for performing tasks, and an entire supporting infrastructure of operations 
and training behind that.)  The next point to appreciate is that the variability between 
employed and contractor salaries is predicted by strategic management theory, 
which highlights that when resources are co-specialized, payoffs can vary 
enormously depending on bargaining dynamics (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003).  
Sometimes one player (say the DoD) may be allowed to claim most of the value; 
sometimes a different player (say, a skilled individual) may be able to claim most of 
the value.  Theory suggests that who is allowed to claim value is underdetermined. 
The first key point (regarding DoD integration of PMFs) that emerges from an 
understanding of PMFs as part of a co-specialized system is that what the DoD does 
affects the value PMFs can bring to the table.  The essence of co-specialization is 
that the resources involved in producing an effect need each other.  How they do as 
a coalition depends on how they interact.  DoD decision-makers are used to 
approaching PMF contracting from the perspective of identifying their needs, and 
then contracting for those.  However, how the Department organizes itself affects the 
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value-added it can receive from having PMFs as part of its team.  This means that 
PMFs are held hostage by DoD strategy, behavior, policy, organizational structures, 
etc., which all affect the efficiency and effectiveness of PMFs.   
If, as emphasized by the Gansler Commission, the 50/50 split between 
contractors and DoD personnel is here to stay, there is a considerable need for DoD 
policy-makers to move from thinking about how they have worked with PMFs in the 
past, to thinking about how they can best work to generate value from the PMFs in 
the next campaign—even if that means challenging some sacred cows regarding 
how the Department organizes itself.  The DoD needs to investigate what might be 
done differently in order to make the PMFs it uses more valuable in performing the 
mission. Perhaps seeing a need to understand this issue in depth, Congress created 
the Commission on Wartime Contracting, currently scheduled to submit its final 
report by June 2010 (Newell, 2009, February 2; Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction, 2009) 
Co-specialization also has important implications for the acquisition function 
in the DoD.  In order for PMFs to add value to the mission, its services need to be 
acquired at the right price.  This would be easy if the defense market was quasi-
perfect or ideal-perfect, i.e., many buyers and sellers of commodity goods.  In this 
situation, buyers (i.e., the DoD) are merely price-takers.  However, this is not the 
reality of the kinds of services the DoD buys from “body shops.”  The resources in 
question are imperfectly mobile, and reputation, speed and secrecy all matter in the 
buying process.  For these reasons, many contracts are sole-source or limited-
competition contracts.  Furthermore, many resources are co-specialized with DoD 
resources or other contractor resources; therefore, the division of value is 
indeterminate.  The result of these factors is that DoD contracting often occurs in 
very imperfect market conditions, often on a negotiated basis.   
In situations with these characteristics, acquisition skills really matter, both at 
the individual and organizational level.  Prior strategic management research has 
already established that pricing capability is an important strategic resource (Dhutta, 
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Zbaracki & Bergen, 2003).  The other side of this coin is acquiring resources at the 
right prices which, by symmetry, is also an important organizational capability.  An 
organization’s ability to obtain contracted services (sometimes referred to as being a 
“knowledgeable client”) depends on two kinds of resources: some that are individual 
in nature (i.e., human capital—having competent, well-trained professionals doing 
the work), and some are organizational in nature (i.e., developing a successful set of 
policies, routines and incentives that work together in a coherent fashion).  An 
organization has a superior contracting capability when these resources enable it to 
be highly effective in its contracting activities given its environmental context (i.e., 
the law, regulatory framework and norms deemed appropriate).  When the context 
changes, we should expect adjustment processes will come into play.  However, as 
highlighted by Argote and Greve, “Because routines are so central to organizational 
functioning, large-scale replacement of routines is a complex endeavor that is done 
at different speeds depending on the group level of agreement with the new realities 
and encouragement of experimentation” (2007). 
By 2007, the Army recognized that its organizational functioning in the 
expeditionary environments of Iraq and Afghanistan was less than desirable.  That 
Service’s efforts to improve the situation are described in the next section. 
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The Contribution of the Gansler Commission 
Within the Army, one of the Gansler Commission’s unique contributions was 
the authors’ insistence on examining real behavior and attitudes within the context of 
a very complex group of competing organizational hierarchies, some of which were 
outside the Army.  These realities drove the recommendations.  For example, the 
report firmly addresses the need for military officers and DoD civil servants to have a 
General leading their occupational community (in this case contracting).  The Army 
leadership reacted quickly to this recommendation, appointing an Acting 
Commander of the new Army Contracting Command (ACC). This command had 
previously been the civilian-led Army Contracting Agency, an organization with little 
authority in Army circles.  Additionally, long-overdue measures to reduce financial 
penalties incurred by deployed civilian contracting officers and to improve their pay 
and benefits were also taken; these measures were particularly important given the 
significant experience of many of these individuals (Bokinsky, 2009). 
These changes were made within four months of the release of the Gansler 
Commission report, which is impressive by DoD standards. The purpose-designed 
organizational structure gives some idea of the Army’s initial commitment to 
implement the Gansler Commission recommendations: 
The ACC will be a two-star level command, with two one-star subordinate 
commands, including an expeditionary command, which will be able to deploy 
when and at the level needed and increase the Army's oversight of 
contracting in theater.  
It will consist of 171 contingency contracting teams of two officers and two 
NCOs each, which will be modular and able to go where needed. The 
expeditionary command will also have 18 battalions of eight to nine people 
each and seven brigades. Each brigade will have a Criminal Investigative 
Division agent and an auditor. 
“The whole idea is that the next time we go into a fight, we'll be prepared,” 
[Army Materiel Command Director of Contracting Jeffery] Parsons said. 
“There's going to be organization. There's going to be individuals responsible 
and accountable for providing that contracting support. The teams deploy. If 
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the fight's going to be a little longer, a battalion deploys. If it's going to be of 
longer duration, the brigade deploys.” (Lorge, 2008) 
In contrast to its attention to detail regarding the ACC’s organization, the 
Gansler Commission report was almost completely silent on the subject of the 
contribution of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to expeditionary 
operations.  The DCMA is an independent agency whose civilian head reports to the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).  While the 
various DoD components’ Procuring Contracting Officers (PCOs) issue contracts, 
actual contract administration is performed by Administering Contracting Officers 
(ACOs).  As part of the DCMA’s creation, all ACOs were absorbed into DCMA.   
However, the DCMA’s mandate does not include administering contracts in-
theater unless they were issued within the United States, such as contracts issued 
under the Army’s LOGCAP.  In effect, this leaves Army PCOs (and anyone else who 
can be found) to actually administer the vast majority of contracts issued in Kuwait, 
Iraq or Afghanistan.  
However, even LOGCAP contracting in Iraq administered by the DCMA has 
created problems due to the lack of adequate monitoring by any DoD organization— 
with PMFs occasionally emerging as subcontractors in what appear to be benign 
support agreements.  For example, KBR received a LOGCAP contract to provide 
food services in 2004, and then hired Blackwater as a sub-sub-subcontractor to 
provide security for the movement of truckloads of food and restaurant equipment, 
billing the Army $19.6 million for Blackwater’s services.  The Army refused to pay, 
stating that KBR’s LOGCAP contract was exclusively for food services, and that the 
firm was contractually bound to use military convoys.  KBR then brought the case 
before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, with no decision expected 
until 2010 (Price, 2009). 
Accordingly, all in-theater resources are devoted to contract award, while 
post-award contract administration (such as the monitoring of PMFs) is neglected.  
The Gansler Commission does break its silence on the DCMA by recommending 
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adding 583 billets to that agency’s staff for Army support. However, there are 
probably few illusions about implementation of this measure, as it would require 
legislation and would impose a deployment orientation on the DCMA, which has 
traditionally operated in a purely static manner (Commission on Army Acquisition 
and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007, pp. 39-40, 50, 56). 
While the Gansler report has led to impressive and rapid changes in the 
Army’s organizational structure for contracting, the changes in organizational 
routines and processes brought about by the creation of ACC are limited by the 
scope of ACC’s mandate within any expeditionary operation.  The difficult issue of 
in-theater management of contracts was mentioned above; there are also 
challenges with coordination with other federal agencies (such as DoS and the 
US Agency for International Development), the short-term nature of funding for 
contracts that makes repeated re-approvals necessary, and the extent to which the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will actually support the Army in its efforts 
to reform contracting.  So far, much remains to be done outside the confines of the 
ACC.  As stated previously in the quotation from Argote and Greve (2007), “large-
scale replacement of routines is a complex endeavor that is done at different 
speeds.”  Discussing the specific issue of DoD-wide oversight of PMFs7, the GAO 
stated: 
In the short term, DOD has increased the number of oversight personnel in 
Iraq by shifting existing oversight personnel from other locations into Iraq. 
However, without developing and implementing a strategy for providing and 
sustaining an increased number of personnel dedicated to oversight of PSCs, 
it is not clear whether DOD can sustain this increase because of the limited 
number of oversight personnel in the workforce. Moreover, while DOD has 
provided some training on PSCs for units deploying, the training has not been 
updated to reflect the changes made by DOD since September 2007 to 
increase oversight. As a result, military units may be unaware of their 
expanded oversight and investigative responsibilities. (GAO, 2008, July 31, 
Highlights page) 
                                            
7 Referred to by the GAO as PSCs (private security companies).  For more information on this 
difference in terminology, see note 1 above. 
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Issuing a contract for PMF services is the beginning of the development of a 
network of complex relationships that will evolve throughout the life of the contract; 
yet, such contracts are awarded without reference to the adequacy of resources for 
implementation. 
After the shooting deaths of 17 Iraqi civilians by Blackwater contractors in 
Baghdad’s Nisour Square in 2007, serious questions were raised about the rise of a 
new mercenary army (Carstens, Cohen & Kűpçű, 2008: 8).  This led to an 
inescapable reality: the Iraqi public is opposed to any use of PMFs, and Blackwater 
had its license to operate revoked by the Iraqi government in January 2009.  
Meanwhile, US prosecutors are preparing to try five former Blackwater employees 
for the Nisour Square incident (US Department of State, 2008; Morin, 2009). 
In the above context, it is not evident how, if at all, the risk associated with the 
employment of PMFs can be managed by the DoD.  We will discuss this issue in the 
next section. 
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Managing the Risks of PMFs 
Since managing the potential risks of employing PMFs is an important part of 
managing these contractors in a deployed situation, in this section, we pay special 
attention to this issue.  By downside risks, we mean the potential for unwelcome 
spillover effects or negative externalities resulting from PMF actions.  As cases in 
Iraq have shown, these may have broad political ramifications—an example being 
the popular outcry following the Nisour Square incident.  In addition, spillover effects 
also have narrower military ramifications, an example being the killing of 4 
Blackwater contractors in March 2004 in Fallujah, which forced the hand of coalition 
forces in the city to engage in large-scale direct military action there 
(GlobalSecurity.org, 2009).  The implication of these, as well as many other 
examples, is that the DoD must take seriously the risks involved in using PMFs as 
armed forces (Avant, 2005).  
How can the resource-based perspective we have outlined in this paper help 
us better understand the nature of this control issue, and what should be done about 
it?  Our first key point emerges from our prior work on the evolution of the PMF 
sector; it is that the large-scale deployment of PMFs is, indeed, a relatively new 
phenomenon.  The average age of firms in the sector is only around 13 years, and 
there has been a large burst in the founding of new firms in the US  This increase 
started in the mid-1990s and accelerated with the conflict in Iraq (Dew & Hudgens, 
2008).  As we highlighted in our opening remarks in this paper, the task set involved 
in running these contracts effectively—including with an eye to their downside 
risks—is more complex and difficult than contracting for goods or even other 
services, even under ideal conditions.  The general economic research on factors 
that generate contract management difficulties is very clear that contracting-out is 
hazardous when the contracted activities are characterized by performance 
uncertainty.  This hazard is made worse when performance monitoring is more 
difficult (costly). 
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In the case of PMF contracting in a war zone, the monitoring problems in part 
stem from the physical dangers involved in engaging in direct monitoring activities.  
Moreover, contracting mechanisms have to be robust enough to withstand two kinds 
of hazards: first, that those contractors may behave opportunistically; and second, 
that physical dangers may induce contractors to shun the terms of contract, even 
without opportunism.  Indeed, one of the distinctive facets of PMF work is that it 
ranges in personal danger.  There is almost always some element of danger (even 
training involves accidents) and, at the limit, regular fatalities.  As explained by the 
GAO in a review of contractor deaths up until April 2008: 
Based on data provided by [the US Department of] Labor, there were 455 
reports received of contractors killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during the period 
of our review and 15,787 reports of injuries. However, there may be additional 
contractor deaths or injuries that were not reported to Labor. (GAO, 2008, 
October 1, pp. 7-8) 
The new nature of the work involved in managing PMFs is clear once we put 
it in the context of our discussion above regarding the dynamics of assembling 
resources.  The task of developing the requisite resources for efficiently and 
effectively managing the large-scale use of PMFs will take time.  A considerable part 
of the resources involved consists of organizational knowledge, i.e., expertise.  This 
knowledge does not just drop out of the air: it must be painstakingly acquired, often 
the hard way: by making mistakes and by learning to fix them.  New organizational 
skills are rarely accumulated quickly because the processes involved—such as trial 
and error, experimental, selection and replication—have to be accumulated by 
experience, and are subject to time diseconomies (i.e., going faster is inefficient).  
Despite already mastering a wide range of acquisition skills, the DoD may just be at 
the front end of building the particular and specialist skills and expertise required to 
handle PMF deployments on a large scale.  The above suggests two key insights: 
1. Despite the urgency and unpredictable emergence of crises, the DoD’s 
acquisition community should be expected to take some time to build a 
capability in managing the downside risks of large-scale deployments 
of PMFs.   
 - 29 - 
2. The full costs of managing PMFs on such a scale are often overlooked 
because decision-makers do not take into account the costs of building 
an organizational capability for managing contractors.   
Of course, another key question is what kinds of resources does the DoD 
need to assemble in order to manage PMFs more effectively?  Here again, a 
resource-based perspective suggests answers different from those commonly 
considered appropriate.  The starting point for considering this different view is to 
realize that PMF risk management is a multidimensional job, as we illustrate in 
Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2. PMF Risk Mitigation:  
Leveraging the Entire Spectrum of Control Systems 
 
The figure highlights three levels of mechanisms for the management of 
PMFs.  The first set of mechanisms are at the micro level: contracts.  Economic 
analyses of contracting relationships focus on key aspects of contracts.  Here, the 
prognosis is first to get the contractual structure right and second, to match it with 
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should follow.  For example, Franck and Melese (2008) have emphasized the 
importance of adoption of a holistic perspective when widening the scope of 
outsourcing to include services: 
The lesson is that transaction cost considerations need to be added to the 
current exclusive focus on production costs ….  This also suggests that more 
attention be granted to: the Statement of Work (for goods) or Performance 
Work Statement (for services); the clear definition of terms of the contract—
including appropriate incentives; an understanding of the complete costs of 
the transaction; and the careful design of governance mechanisms to 
maximize potential benefits from the outsourcing relationship. 
In addition to the contract, the outer layer of the control mechanisms 
highlighted in Figure 2 is the set of macro social control mechanisms that facilitate 
the management of PMFs.  These social control mechanisms are best exemplified in 
the work of Deborah Avant (2005), whose research focuses on the diffusion of 
control in the market for PMF services.  Avant highlights both the limits of contracts 
and several problems that arise from the sheer number of players (both on the 
buying and selling side) involved in the PMF sector.  She argues that broader social 
institutions, therefore, play an important role in regulating the sector, which might 
have the potential to instill some order in the geopolitical system. 
Beyond these two sets of control mechanisms, we highlight a third 
intermediate (meso) layer which has been less examined—the organizational 
network for controlling PMFs.  Many organizational players interface with—and are 
potentially engaged in managing—PMFs.  A resource-based perspective suggests 
that in order to manage such PMFs effectively, we need to think in terms of a broad-
based network of organizations that collectively represent a capability for monitoring 
and managing contractors in conflict zones.  Earlier in this paper, we suggested that 
one of the lessons that has emerged in studies of organizational networks is that the 
critical resources involved in creating and applying knowledge sometimes reside in 
the broader network rather than in any individual organization.  This places the 
capability for monitoring and managing PMFs in an intangible resource: the maze of 
relationships, gaps and interstices, between organizations.   
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Therefore, the resource for managing downside risk in PMFs can be found in 
the ecology of linked organizational players operating in a conflict zone.  Avant 
(2005, p. 241) refers to this ecology as networked governance and inter-
organizational administration of PMFs.  This network resource complements the 
other resources—contract and social institutions—that form a part of Figure 2.  
Together, these three sets of mechanisms form a system for managing contractors 
on the battlefield that provides a spectrum of control options. 
The forgoing analysis suggests that the DoD might place more emphasis on 
network relationships in order to improve PMF control.  If PMF management could 
be improved just by managing contracts better, then those managerial activities 
would fall to the contracting officer job.  The answer would be for government to 
improve the contracting process, and in particular (per the Gansler report) to 
improve contract monitoring processes and evaluation.  However, the argument we 
have presented here suggests that “fixing” contract management is only one 
problem the DoD might address.  In fact, we believe there are limits on what the 
DoD can expect the contracting process and its officers/staffers to be able to 
accomplish by attending to contracts alone.  It would be more useful to view 
potential PMF contributions in the context of the control mechanisms highlighted in 
Figure 2.  While the elements of social control are either in the realm of law-makers 
or are subject to broader social forces, DoD decision-makers still have the ability to 
improve PMF management by working at the inter-organizational (meso) level, i.e., 
by leveraging and building the organizational network. 
Based on our analysis, we believe DoD policy-makers should consider two 
modest recommendations.  First, a central theme of the Gansler report is the need 
for training and awareness among DoD field commanders regarding their role in 
managing the PMFs operating in their areas of responsibility.  We would actually 
broaden this to include training and awareness for the network of partner 
organizations at work in a particular combat zone.  In short, we think a shift in 
perspective is required, that would raise the awareness of military and civil service 
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professionals (in non-acquisition functions) of their critical, though indirect role to 
play in managing the contractor force.   
The second recommendation also involves a cultural change. We suggest 
that inter-organizational processes be established for proactively collecting feedback 
on several aspects of PMF performance.  The current system, as we see it, appears 
to be driven by exception reporting and whistle-blowing.  In this system, non-DoD 
organizational actors and other stakeholders are not necessarily solicited for useful 
information, but often on an adversarial basis.   
As highlighted in a recent GAO report (2008, October 1), even assembling 
information on the presence of contractors and contractor fatalities has proven 
challenging.  Networks flourish on information, and policy-makers need to get 
information moving in the PMF management network.  What is needed is a much 
more open-system approach to gathering information on PMF activities—one that 
facilitates and encourages monitoring by the whole range of organizational actors, 
and collects positive as well as negative incident reports.  A range of technological 
options might be considered here, but we also emphasize that leveraging and 
building an inter-organizational capability for PMF monitoring will involve many “soft” 
processes and activities, as well as hard technological capability. 
Our third and final recommendation concerns the organizational skill set that 
the DoD needs to build in order to be successful at leveraging the inter-
organizational network discussed above.  Nurturing networks is a different business 
than running a hierarchical organization because the principles on which networks 
operate are different.  It is not our intention here to add to the important discussion 
on the role of networks in contemporary warfare (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2002; Arquilla 
& Borer, 2007).  However, we do believe that in addition to building the direct 
acquisition skills necessary to successfully manage PMFs in conflict zones, the DoD 
must also put effort into building a set of indirect skills that will help the acquisition 
community progress and improve.   
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Networking and partnering skills may have great value in this context.  
Therefore, with the arrival of the 50/50 DoD/contractor reality, the time has come for 
the DoD acquisition community to recognize that network-related skills should be 
developed in a proactive way.  In a 50/50 world, the DoD needs a somewhat 
different skill set if it is to efficiently and effectively manage the PMFs that are part of 
its overall mission. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has proposed that the resource-based view of the firm—with its 
emphasis on examining organizations from the perspective of their inherent 
resources, processes and routines—may be helpful in understanding the rapid 
growth of the use of private military firms by the DoD.  Our review has also 
suggested that a more holistic approach to the use of PMFs may help the DoD 
increase its available resources and, therefore, improve its overall performance.  
However, the lack of investment in contracting as the critical enabler for the use of 
PMFs may have significantly affected military capabilities. Also, the US government 
appears to lack an appropriate framework of control—ranging from legislation and 
political decision-making at the macro level to adequate supervision of PMFs within 
the expeditionary environment at the micro level.  The expeditionary environment, 
which often involves coalitions, the conscious choice of small units and 
counterinsurgency tactics, may lead to increased use of PMFs.   
Between these macro and micro perspectives, we find, in some cases, 
structures and routines that have sometimes shifted in the direction of establishing a 
more effective control system, such as the rapid creation of Army Contracting 
Command following the report of the Gansler Commission.  In other cases, 
organizations such as the Defense Contract Management Agency have generally 
failed to contribute to the collective monitoring capability that supports the risk-
mitigation resources that must be in place when the decision is made to engage 
PMFs as a supplement to government resources. 
Our examination of the use of PMFs by the DoD has, in our view, 
demonstrated the applicability of the resource-based view of the firm in that we have 
moved beyond the more established (a) descriptive/organizational and (b) 
economics-based research approaches to establish a generalized perspective that 
assesses inherent resources, processes and routines.  
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 We would suggest that further research focus on extending the resource-
based view into more specific aspects of contracting for PMFs—particularly given 
the critical need for sound insights that will help determine both an appropriate legal 
framework and risk-mitigation strategy that will support the inevitable incorporation of 
these firms into US and coalition forces. 
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